Unpacking the Privacy Risks: Smart TVs as Proxies, Drone Surveillance, and Border Phone Searches

Featured image: Photo by Thomas Windisch on Pexels.

In an increasingly interconnected world, the boundaries of personal privacy are continually being tested and redefined. What once seemed like private domains—our homes, our movements in public, and even the contents of our personal devices—are now subject to various forms of scrutiny and data collection. From the smart devices we invite into our living rooms to the aerial observers monitoring our communities and the digital scrutiny at national borders, the landscape of privacy is shifting dramatically. Understanding these evolving threats is crucial for navigating modern life with a degree of digital autonomy and security. This article unpacks three significant areas where privacy is under pressure: the unexpected role of smart TVs as residential proxies, the burgeoning use of drones for surveillance, and the implications of suspicionless phone searches at the border.

Smart TVs: Unwitting Gateways for Third-Party Traffic

Many modern households have embraced smart televisions, drawn by their convenience, streaming capabilities, and integration with other smart home devices. However, these seemingly innocuous entertainment hubs can harbor significant, often hidden, privacy risks. One such risk recently came to light concerning smart TVs being repurposed as residential proxy nodes by third-party applications. A residential proxy routes internet traffic through a user’s home IP address, making it appear as if the traffic originates from that location. While legitimate uses for residential proxies exist, their misuse can have serious implications for the unsuspecting homeowner.

Research has revealed that a substantial number of applications designed for smart TV platforms can turn a user’s television into an always-on residential proxy node. Specifically, it was found that more than 42 percent of games and other apps available for download on LG’s webOS store allowed unknown third-parties to route their internet traffic through a user’s TV [1]. This means that without the user’s explicit knowledge or consent, their home internet connection could be utilized by others for various online activities.

The implications of such a practice are multi-faceted and alarming. Firstly, it can lead to a significant drain on a household’s internet bandwidth, potentially slowing down other online activities. More critically, if the third-party traffic routed through a user’s TV is engaged in illicit or illegal activities, the user’s IP address could be implicated, leading to legal complications or unwarranted scrutiny. The owner of the smart TV effectively becomes an unwitting intermediary for potentially malicious or unauthorized online behavior.

The home appliance giant LG Electronics USA has responded to these findings, announcing plans to suspend any apps built for its smart TVs that turn a television into a residential proxy node [1]. While this is a welcome step, it underscores a broader vulnerability inherent in smart devices: their capacity to be exploited or repurposed in ways that compromise user privacy and security. As more smart devices become integral to our daily lives, the need for stringent app vetting, transparent data practices, and user awareness becomes paramount. Consumers must be vigilant about the permissions granted to apps and understand the potential hidden functions of their connected devices.

The Expanding Reach of Drone Surveillance

Beyond the confines of our homes, our movements in public spaces are increasingly subject to aerial observation. Drone-as-First-Responder (DFR) programs are rapidly gaining traction across the country, fundamentally altering the landscape of public safety and surveillance. These programs enable police departments and other emergency services to deploy drones autonomously or remotely to incident scenes, often before human officers arrive. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has streamlined the process for obtaining waivers necessary for automated drone operations, particularly for flights Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS), leading to a massive surge in approvals.

Since April 2025, the FAA has issued more waivers than in the previous seven years combined, with over 1,000 public safety agencies receiving the necessary approvals by February 2026 to launch DFR programs [2]. This shift signifies a move from human-operated aerial surveillance to highly automated drone use, expanding data collection even into areas patrol officers typically cannot reach. DFR technology allows drones to launch from pads placed around cities, often atop municipal buildings, and be operated remotely, sometimes with a single operator managing multiple devices simultaneously [2].

Proponents of DFR programs argue they enhance “situational awareness” for officers, particularly in high-risk scenarios. However, evidence suggests deployments often occur in response to low-risk calls, such as those related to unhoused individuals, mental health concerns, or noise complaints [2]. The footage captured by these flying cameras is streamed back to police offices, where it can be stored, shared, and analyzed. This data can easily be integrated into existing surveillance networks; for instance, some drones have been converted into “flying ALPRs” (Automated License Plate Readers) [2].

The normalization of DFR programs poses significant privacy risks for communities. Drones, as flying cameras, can capture footage from areas traditionally considered private and inaccessible to ground-level observation—including backyards, roofs, and through windows—often from distances that leave individuals completely unaware they are being watched [2]. This pervasive aerial surveillance can observe innocent individuals for extended periods without their knowledge, as demonstrated by leaked drone footage from some police departments. To mitigate these concerns, transparency and community involvement are critical. Cities should implement clear policies on appropriate drone use, provide advance notice of intent to acquire such technology, and offer real-time logging of flight paths and reasons for deployment, ensuring communities have a say in whether these programs are adopted at all [2].

Border Phone Searches: A Lower Standard for Digital Lives

The digital privacy concerns extend even to our most personal devices when crossing national borders. A recent ruling by the Fourth Circuit in *U.S. v. Belmonte Cardozo* has significant implications for how our electronic devices are treated at U.S. borders, establishing a lower standard for manual phone searches compared to forensic ones [3]. This decision allows border agents to conduct extraordinarily invasive electronic device searches without any suspicion of wrongdoing, simply because they choose to search by hand rather than using specialized software.

The Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant based on probable cause for government searches. However, the “border search exception” allows warrantless searches of persons and property crossing the U.S. border, based on the government’s interest in controlling who and what enters the country. Historically, “routine” searches of luggage or vehicles required no suspicion, while “nonroutine” searches, like certain body searches, required reasonable suspicion.

The Supreme Court, in *Riley v. California* (2014), recognized the unique and unprecedented privacy interests people have in their cell phones, stating that phones contain “the sum of an individual’s private life” and bear “little resemblance” to physical containers. This ruling generally requires a warrant for phone searches within the country’s interior. Following this, prior Fourth Circuit decisions had established that forensic searches of devices at the border, which involve using software to extract and analyze data, typically require individualized suspicion [3].

However, in *Belmonte Cardozo*, the court ruled that manual searches of cell phones at the border are “routine” and thus reasonable under the Fourth Amendment without a warrant or individualized suspicion [3]. The court distinguished manual searches from forensic ones based on factors like the human element, the search’s breadth depending on an officer’s time and energy, and manual searches only revealing what a user can typically access. Yet, critics argue that these technical differences do not justify a lower standard, as manual searches can still access the same categories of highly personal data that reveal intimate details about a person’s life, beliefs, and associations [3]. Even a brief manual search, lasting only a few minutes, can expose deeply personal information, especially with improved native search functions on devices that can quickly surface data through keyword searches.

While the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on the two-minute duration of the search in the *Belmonte Cardozo* case might leave open the possibility that lengthier manual searches could trigger heightened suspicion requirements, the current ruling allows border officers within its jurisdiction to bypass stronger Fourth Amendment standards. This means individuals crossing the border face the risk of having their entire digital life scrutinized without any prior indication of wrongdoing, highlighting a significant vulnerability for personal data at points of entry [3].

Key Takeaways

• Smart TVs can be inadvertently turned into residential proxy nodes by third-party apps, potentially consuming bandwidth and implicating users in unknown online activities.
• Drone-as-First-Responder (DFR) programs are rapidly expanding, allowing highly automated drone surveillance in public spaces, often without public awareness or sufficient oversight.
• DFR drones can collect vast amounts of video data, including from private areas, which can be stored, shared, and integrated into broader surveillance networks.
• The Fourth Circuit has ruled that manual phone searches at the U.S. border are “routine” and do not require individualized suspicion, allowing agents to access highly personal data without a warrant.
• This distinction between manual and forensic searches at the border overlooks the profound privacy interests individuals have in their digital devices, regardless of the search method.

Sources

1. [1] LG to Ban Residential Proxies from Smart TV Apps (krebsonsecurity.com)
2. [2] Hundreds of Drone-as-First-Responder Programs Could Soon Be Launched Across the Country (www.eff.org)
3. [3] The Fourth Circuit Says Border Agents Can Search Your Phone By Hand, No Suspicion Required (www.eff.org)

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